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MISCALCULATION IN CONTRACTS: THE TORT-SCHEMA
IN GERMAN AND COMMON LAW
ROBERT DUGAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE law of torts consists of a body of community norms which describe the
behavior of reasonable men. To the extent that these norms do, in fact,
approximate reasonable behavior, violations usually originate in some miscal-
culation.1 Certainly, many tortfeasors of the non-malicious variety would so
excuse themselves. The law of negligent torts thus becomes the law of actionable
miscalculation vis-A-vis a set of norms. The law of torts has developed a simple,
unified approach to miscalculation. A miscalculation becomes actionable if it
(1) violates the right of another, (2) results from culpability, and (3) causes
monetary or emotional harm.2 The German Civil Code, in section 823, com-
presses its tort law into one paragraph which emphasizes these three elements:
Whoever negligently or intentionally injures the rights of another [here, enumer-
ated rights] must compensate for the harm caused thereby.3
Not all norms are, however, community norms. Behavior within two party,
contractual norms is just as susceptible to miscalculation as behavior under the
community norms of tort law. The error may appear in the contractor's motiva-
tion, in the formation of the agreement, or in the evaluation of the counter-
performance. The obligor buys a wedding present in ignorance that the parties
have terminated their engagement. He understands an offer of 6,000 dollars as
3,000 dollars. He assumes that the Peerless arrives in October. He sells a cow
cheap, believing it barren. He enters a long term lease ignorant of the fact that
Prince Rupert's invasion will prevent him from enjoying possession. He promises
to build without complete knowledge of the underlying soil conditions. He sells
a stack of hay not knowing that lightning will destroy it before delivery. He
rents a room to view a coronation parade in ignorance about the King's appen-
dix. He leases a building as an auto show room, ignorant that the government
will soon restrict the sale of cars. In every case, the errant party has, from the
other's point of view, subjected himself to an enforceable set of norms. The day
of reckoning comes when the other party wants performance or its equivalent
in damages. Our errant friend will, in some form, plead his miscalculation.
Contract law, unlike that of torts, lacks a single formula whose generality
*BA. 1963, MA. 1964, Stanford University; J.D. 1967, M.C.L. 1969, University of
Chicago.
1. CI. 0. Hornsxs, THE CoahoN LAW 108-09 (Little, Brown & Co. ed. 1881): "But
he who is intelligent and prudent does not act at his peril, in the theory of law. On the
contrary, it is only when he fails to exercise the foresight, or exercises it with evil intent
that he is answerable for the consequences."
2. See W. PRossER, TORTS § 1, headnote at 1 (2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].
3. BfitRLsicmCs GFasETzBucH § 823, para. 1 (Ger. 22d ed. Palandt 1963) [hereinafter
cited as BGB].
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encompasses all kinds of error at whatever level of the contract. The miscalcu-
lations described above evoke a Pavlovian association with a dozen different
doctrines: meeting of the minds, unilateral and bilateral mistake, mistake as to
material fact, a variety of impossibilities (subsequent, antecedent, personal,
objective), passage of title, ascertainment, genre and specie debts, frustration of
purpose, and conditions subsequent and precedent. This is not to mention the
side issues of reliance, distribution of risk, diligence, available remedies, the
Restatement, and Corbin versus Williston.
Aesthetics, not to mention the jury's legendary common sense, demand from
dogma a certain simplicity and parsimony. 4 Tort law has achieved this. But the
nature of miscalculation remains the same whether it occurs within the context
of community norms or private, two-party norms. We should not, therefore, be
surprised that the diverse miscalculation doctrines in the law of contracts show
the imprint of the more general tort schema: 5 Miscalculation is actionable if it
leads to an injury of another's right, if it originates in culpability, and if it causes
pecuniary or emotional distress.
II. TYPirs oF MISCALCULATION
Misstatement
Miscalculation easily infects the communications involved in forming a
contract. The seller asks 150 dollars, the buyer hears fifty and accepts. Or the
buyer means to purchase lot number one but refers to number two and the seller
accepts. Consistency with the tort-schema would demand that the plaintiff sup-
port his claim to performance or its equivalent in damages with proof of an
injured right, culpability, and detriment. The German Civil Code in section
119 (1) makes the following provision for misstatement: If a party errs as to the
meaning of his declaration or did not intend to convey such a meaning, he may
avoid his declaration provided that, with knowledge and understanding of the
situation, he would not have so expressed himself.6 Since a contract requires a
valid offer and acceptance, avoidance of either avoids the contract.7 In common
law, misstatement also leads to avoidance.8 The exact availability of the remedy
4. 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS viii (rev. ed. 1936) [hereinafter cited as 1 ILLISTON].
Contra, F. KESSLER & M. SHARP, CONTRACTS 1 (1953). This distrust of simplicity, which
originates to reaction to "mechanical jurisprudence," has frustrated rigorous inquiry into the
nature and role of rules, see Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14, 15-17,
25-27, 44-46 (1967).
5. On the effect of blameworthy conduct in the formation of contracts, see Kessler &
Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, And Freedom of Contract: A Com-
parative Study, 77 HARv. L. Rxv. 401 (1964).
6. For the history and application of this mistake provision, see 5 S. WILLIsToN, Cox-
TRACTS § 1600-B-E (rev. ed. 1937); [hereinafter cited as 5 WILrSToN]; Kessler & Fine, id.
at 426-31.
7. BGB § 142, para. 1. On the distinction between nullity ab initio and voidability,
which is crucial in determining the rights of third parties, see 5 WILLISTON § 1538; Sabbath,
Effects of Mistake in Contracts: A Study in Comparative Law, 13 INT'IL & COMlp. L.Q. 798,
799-805 (1964).
8. Cf. 5 WIusroN § 1577; 1 A. CoaBN § 104, at 463 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1
CoRBN]; 3 id. § 599, at 592-96 (1960) [hereinafter cited as 3 CoRIN].
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depends upon one's preference for the subjective or objective theory of assent.9
Section 119(1) and its common law counterpart prevent the plaintiff from
proving the first element of his case: injured right. As regards the performance
claim, there appears to be no need to talk about the other two elements of the
tort-schema: culpability and damages. Neither a tort nor a contract claim can
derive from the elements of culpability and damage alone. A proof of injured
right is a necessary prerequisite. 10 Both German and common law doctrines of
mistake reflect this dogmatic point: the mistaken party will not be denied relief,
i.e., compelled to perform, even though he may have acted negligently." Neither
German nor common law afford relief to a misstatement made in conscious dis-
regard of normal usage.12 Most misstatements, however, originate in negligent
innocence. They hinder the inception of performance rights and the issue of cul-
pability never arises at the level of performance rights and duties.
Avoidance of the contract may make the plaintiff regret his encounter with
the other party. The plaintiff may have foregone subsequent offers, paid con-
tracting costs, or incurred expenses preparatory to performance. The issue arises
whether, in the face of his defeated performance claim, the plaintiff should
receive compensation for reliance injuries. The German Civil Code, in section
122, provides the following disposition of reliance interests: If a declaration is
avoided under section 119, the declarant shall compensate the harm which the
other party suffers, because he relied on the validity of the declaration. Case law
and commentary suggest that the common law recognizes a similar norm.'3
Instead of speaking of reliance damages, courts and commentators "condition"
avoidance on restoration of the status quo. In addition, the legendary refusal
of relief for "unilateral" mistakes constitutes a de facto protection of reliance
interests. Parties and courts will find "mutuality" more readily in situations
where neither party has relied on the contract. 14
The commentary to sections 119 and 122 of the German Civil Code ex-
plains the protection of reliance interests in terms of rights and culpability.
The right involved is the right of a party to a contractual relationship-be
9. Compare RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 71, comment a (1932) and 5 WILIsToN
§ 1535, at 4323, § 1536, at 4324-25, with 1 CORBIn 474, 3 id. § 599, at 595-97 (1960) ; see
Kessler & Fine, supra note 5 at 426-27; and Sharp, Promissory Liability II, 7 U. CH-. L. REv.
250, 264-67 (1940), who belittles the practical consequences of the distinction in light of the
limitations on both doctrines.
10. Cf. PROSSER § 1, at 6.
11. RESTATEmENT OF CONTRACTS § 508 (1932). Cf. 3 CoRBx" § 606, at 655 (1966); 5
WILLISTON § 1596; on German law, see W. ER.miu-WEsTEMAm"N § 119, Anm. 1 (4th ed.
1967).
12. Cf. REsTAT EMET OF CONTRACTS §§ 71, 501 & comment b (1932); 1 CORBIn § 104,
at 464-65, § 106, at 477; 3 id. § 599, at 593. In German law, the requirement in BGB § 119(1)
for an error in intention excludes relief for intentional misstatement. In addition, BB §§ 116,
117, 118, and 122 limit relief in cases of secret reservation, fake agreement, joke, and fraud;
see SOEROGL-HEFE mE, KO mENTAR zum BGB VoR. § 116, Rdnrn. 25-27 (10th ed. 1967).
13. See RESTATFMENT OF CONTRACTs § 502(c) (1932); 5 WILLISTON § 1594; 3 CORBIN
§ 599, at 599-602, § 605, at 643, § 606, at 649-55, § 608, at 671-73, 677, 682.
14. Cf. 3 CoRBN § 609 (1960); Sabbath, Effects of Mistakes in Contracts: A Study in
Comparative Law, 13 INTL' & ComP. L.Q.'798, 814 (1964).
443
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it completed, inchoate, or in the process of execution- to rely on the state-
ments of the other party. Reliance rights, in contrast to performance rights, are
not two-party contractual norms. Like the community norms of tort law, they
apply to all parties who would contract or have already done so.Yr Performance
rights and duties form one level of every contract. Reliance rights and duties
comprise a second. We shall encounter still others. Vindication of rights, at
whatever level, must conform to the simple tort-schema of injured right, culpa-
bility, and damage.
The notion of reliance rights fulfills the first prerequisite of the tort-schema.
The third, damage, is determined by the other party's reliance expenditures.
There remains only the element of responsibility. In the case of misstatement,
both German and common law presume that the misstatement originated in a
lack of dilligence.16 What a party says, hears, or writes, lies uniquely within his
control. In addition, the mistaken party's avoidance of a contract is itself a
decidedly intentional act, which must frustrate the other party's reliance inter-
ests. A showing that the other party knew or negligently failed to know of the
mistake will, in both German and common law, defeat the assumption. 7 In this
fashion, the issue of culpability completely determines the success of the plain-
tiff's claim for reliance damages. Reliance damages may exceed or fall below the
plaintiff's initial claim to performance or its money equivalent (expectation
damages). The German Civil Code, in section 122, places a limit on reliance
claims: The compensation may not exceed the interest which the injured party
had in the validity of the declaration. Restriction of reliance damages to ex-
pectation interest represents a rough balancing of equities which occurs through-
out German and common law. Whenever culpability is assumed, as in the case
of reliance injuries resulting from avoidance of a misstatement, the law restricts
the measure of damages."8
Ambiguity
The famous case of Raffles v. Wichelhaus presents a different type of mis-
calculation."9 There, the parties contracted for delivery of cotton with the
15. SoEROGE-HEIEuamm supra note 12, at § 116, Rdnr. 13, § Rdnr. 1; 5 WILLISTON
§ 1600C, at 4474-75 (rev. ed. 1937).
16. 5 WiLsToN § 1596, at 4447 (rev. ed. 1937); K. LARxuz, ALmGmEINER TL DES
DEUTSCmEN Bi-RGERrBE N REcnTES 389 (1967) [hereinafter cited as LAREmz, ALLoEMMER
TEL].
17. Cf. 1 CORBNm § 106, at 477; 3 id. § 606, at 649, § 609, at 680 (1960). In German
law, the other party, if he knew or should have known of the mistake, not only loses his
claim for reliance damages, BGB § 122(2), he may also subject himself to a damage Claim
under the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo: see SOERGEL-HEPEREmr., supra note 12, § 122,
Rdnrn. 607; Kessler & Fine, supra note 5, at 429-32 (1964).
18. See PROSSER § 60, at 388; EssER, SCHULDREcHT-ALLoEr EINER TEIL 72-3 (3d ed.
1968). On the limits of reliance relief in the common law of contracts, see 3 CORBIN § 599,
602, § 606, at 655; Fuller & Purdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages 1, 46 YALE
L.J. 52, 75 (1936). The German warranty remedies further exemplify this principle of limited
liability: see infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
19. 2 Hurl. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
444
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ship "Peerless." Unbeknown to them, there were two ships by that name. The
buyer assumed delivery on the one; the seller, on the other. The case falls
under a second provision, section 155, of the German Civil Code governing
mistake: If the parties regard a contract as perfected, but have in fact failed
to agree on one of its points, the agreement is valid to the extent that the party
would have contracted without settlement of this point. This section applies
whenever ambiguous terms are used: dollars, francs, Peerless, a record of Strauss
waltzes, gallon, pound, etc. In such cases the German Civil Code considers that
no contract comes into existence.
20
Section 155 comports with the language (apparently approved by the court)
of the defendant's counsel in Raffles: "[T ] here is a latent ambiguity . . . . That
being so, there was no consensus ad idem, and therefore no binding contract.)
21
Such a doctrine defeats, as did the misstatement rule, the plaintiff's proof of en-
forceable right. The other two elements of the tort-schema, culpability and
damages, do not arise in adjudication of the performance claim. The plaintiff
is left with possible detriment at the reliance level. In cases of ambiguity, the
law resolves the tension between reliance rights and responsibility differently from
in the case of unilateral misstatement. Other things being equal, the one party
exercises no more control over the ambiguity, the source of miscalculation, than
the other. Although a reliance right may be violated and damages suffered, the
second prerequisite, culpability, remains unfulfilled. German courts award no
reliance damages in cases under section 155. Common law reports do not, unlike
their treatment of misstatement, condition release on a restoration of the status
quo.
22
Under German law, the seller in Raffles might, however, pursue a claim
under the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo, i.e., negligence in contracting. This
doctrine involves a third level of contractual obligations.23 Suppose the defendant
buyer went down to the wharf in October and found a Peerless ship but no
cotton. Suppose, too, the buyer checked and found another Peerless due in
December. German law would place him under a duty to notify the seller. This
would enable the seller to avoid the costs and hazards of shipping. Should the
defendant buyer fail to do this, a German court could require him to compensate
the seller for harm which resulted from the failure to notify.
24
20. Discussion of BGB § 155 appears in 5 WILLISTON § 1006E, at 4482-84 and Kessler
& Fine, supra note 5, at 427-28. On the distinction between nullity and avoidability, see
supra note 7.
21. 2 Hurl. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Reg. 375. Cf. RESTATEIMNT OF CONTRACTS § 71 & com-
ment a (1932) ; 1 CORBIN § 104, at 466; 3 id. & 599, at 595-96, § 608, at 671.
22. It is one of the few contexts in which Corbin does not insist on restoration of the
status quo: see 3 CORBIN § 599, at 595-96, § 608, at 671 (1960). On German law, see SoER E:L-
LANGE, KOMMENTAR zims BGB VoR. § 155, Rdnr. 19 (10th ed. 1967); FLumE, ALLrImxnmR
TEI. DES BfRGERLIcHEN Rzc srs, BD. H, DAS REcnTsGEsCH rr 625-26 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as FLum, ALLGEMmINER TErL].
23. See Kessler & Fine, supra note 5 at 402-20 (1964).
24. Id. at 427-28.
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Mistake Regarding a Material Fact
A third type of mistake characterizes cases like Sherwood v. Walker2 and
Wood v. Boynton.26 In Sherwood, the seller thought he was selling a barren cow;
she turned out to be pregnant. In Wood, a rough stone turned out to be a
diamond. These cases involve neither a misstatement nor any misunderstanding
arising from an ambiguous term. Section 119(2) of the German Civil Code
provides the following for mistakes regarding a material fact: A mistake con-
cerning an essential characteristic of a person or thing is deemed to be a mistake
concerning the purport of the declaration. A "mistake concerning the purport of
a declaration," we observed, enables the declarant to avoid the declaration and
therewith the contract. He must, however, pay limited reliance damages. The
common law also recognizes the possibility of relief when a party miscalculates
as to a material fact.27 It protects reliance interests by conditioning relief on
restoration of the status quo or by invoking the law about unilateral mistake.28
Mistakes regarding a material fact have long been troublesome. Taken
literally, the doctrine would permit avoidance of every transaction of a specula-
tive nature. Both German and common law have evolved the same two limita-
tions on the doctrine. Section 119(2) expresses the first: the mistake must
concern an essential characteristic. The majority opinion in Sherwood alludes to
this requirement: "[T] he mistake was not one of the mere quality of the animal,
but went to the very nature of the thing. '29 The second prerequisite is more
nebulous and crucial: The parties must have "agreed" on the particular charac-
teristic. This agreement need not be express. Both the majority and dissent in
Sherwood emphasize its importance: "She was not in fact the animal, or the kind
of animal, the defendants intended to sell or the plaintiff to buy."30 The dissent
found no such common intention but admitted its importance: "It is, however,
elementary law .. . that the mistaken party, acting entirely upon his own
judgement, without any common understanding with the other party in the
premises as to the quality of the animal, is remediless . . . .,' The court split
over the same issue which divides German courts in similar circumstances
25. 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887).
26. 64 Wis. 265, 25 N.W. 42 (1885).
27. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 502 & comment a, illustrations 1, 2 (1932); 5
WILLISTON §§ 1559, 1570A; 3 CoRnx § 605, at 641-43. For criticism of the civil law approach,
see Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 CoL.u. L.
REv. 335, 355-56 (1924); contra, Sharp, Promissory Liability, 7 U. CH. L. Rav. 250, 265
(1940).
28. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
29. 66 Mich. 568, at 572, 33 N.W. 919 at 923. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTs § 502
(1932); 5 WILLISTON, § 1593.
30. 66 Mich. 568, at 572, 33 N.W. 919 at 923. See RESTATEMENT oF CoNRAcrs § 502
(1932); 5 WILLISTON, §§ 1544, 1570, 1570A; 3 CoRonr § 605, at 643. On German law, see
SOEmGELr-HEFERPErHL, supra note 12, at § 119, Rdnrn. 26-8; FLUME, ALLGEMEMNR Tzm 478.
The requirement of "agreement" is at many points synonymous with the denial of relief for
unilateral mistake; compare RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 503 (1932) and 5 WILLISTON
§§ 1578, 1579, with 3 CoRmIN § 608.
31. 66 Mich. 565, at 568, 33 N.W. 919, at 926 (emphasis added).
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under section 119(2) .32 The court in Wood v. Boynton refused to grant relief
since there was no "warranty" regarding the quality of the stone. 3
The doctrine of mistake regarding material fact can be formulated in terms
of the tort-schema. The buyer's right to a pregnant cow or a rough diamond
must derive from the contract. The crux of the doctrine, the need for agreement
or warranty, focuses on this requirement. Failure to show agreement defeats the
contract and hence the claim to performance or its equivalent in damages. The
fact of detriment (e.g., the buyer had made a forward contract for sale of the
object) or the seller's negligence in calculation will not support a claim for
performance or performance-damages any more than allegations of culpability
and damages establish a tort claim without proof of a violated right.
The defeated plaintiff may, however, benefit from the application of the
tort-schema at the reliance level. Both German and common law recognize a
reliance right. The culpability issue is resolved differently from one type of
miscalculation to the next. Both German and common law presume the defendant
responsible for the error involved in misstatements but not for that arising from
ambiguity. In the case of mistake regarding material fact, both follow the
assumption made in the misstatement doctrine. The source of the miscalculation
usually lies within the avoiding party's possession and control, as does his
ability to mishear, miswrite, or misspeak. The court in Wood reflects this
attitude: "The appellant had the stone in her possession for a long time, and it
appears from her own statement that she had made some inquiry as to its nature
and qualities."' ' Such language strongly hints at a presumption of culpability.
0
III. FRom MISTAKE TO IMPOSSIBILITY3
5
The mistake doctrines operate on both the performance and reliance levels
of a contract. They attack the plaintiff's right to performance but protect his
reliance interest. This general solution befits only a fraction of the miscalcula-
tions possible within the context of contractual obligations. Contractors over-
estimate the firmness of the soil and their buildings collapse. Farmers err about
the weather, buyers and sellers about war, debtors about bank moratoria,
lessees about the health of kings and battle plans of their princes, and lessors
about the continued existence of their premises.
These cases do not yield to the doctrine of mistake regarding material fact.
For want of agreement on the miscalculated item the right to performance can-
32. Cf. 3 CORBIN § 605, at 643; LARENz, ALLG EiMNER TEIL 381; SOERGEL-HFrERm EL,
supra note 12, at § 199, Rdnr. 33.
33. 25 N.W. 42, 44-45.
34. Id. at 44. Cf. 5 WILLISTON § 1595, at 4447; 3 CORBIN § 608, at 672.
35. On the overlap between the doctrines of mistake and impossibility, see RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS § 468 comment d, § 502 & illustrations 2, 8 (1932); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1946, § 1952, at 5468-69, § 1953, at 5474-75, § 1562 (rev. ed. 1938) (hereinafter cited as
6 WILLISTON]; 6 CORBIN § 1326, at 339 (1962) [hereinafter cited as 6 CoRrN]; H. JONES,
E. FARNswoRTH & W. YouNG, CASES AND MATERIS ON CONTRACTS 963-64, 980-81 (1965);
Sharp, Promissory Liability II, 7 U. Cmn. L. REv. 250, 268-69 (1940).
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not be avoided.8 6 Legend has it that the common law did, at one time, jump
from performance right to the duty to pay damages.37 Such strict liability is
warranted if the defendant generally controls the source of the miscalculation.
For this reason, the mistake doctrine differentiated between cases of misstate-
ment and ones of ambiguity.
88
In the case of facts exterior to the agreement, some facts (e.g., acts of God,
war, and the plaintiff's own culpability) are further from the defendant's
sphere than others (e.g., the quality of the soil beneath the collapsed building).
Conformance to the tort-schema would demand the following treatment: Having
found no agreement regarding the miscalculated fact, the court would not,
solely on the basis of the existing performance right, decree performance or its
damage equivalent. Instead, it would proceed to consider the second element of
the tort-schema: culpability. This is, in fact, what happens under the rubric of
"impossibility."8 9 Impossibility can be antecedent or subsequent, objective or
subjective, and relate to either specie or genre debts.40 The madness of number
and variety is not without a certain logic and purpose. The distinctions serve
different elements of the tort-schema.
Objective Antecedent Impossibility
Objective antecedent impossibility occurs when a party undertakes to per-
form a task of which no one is capable: turning lead into gold. Both German and
the common law deem such contracts void.41 The plaintiff is unable to plead
the first element of his case, a right to performance. In this respect, the doc-
trine of objective antecedent impossibility resembles the various mistake
remedies. There remains, as in the case of a successful mistake plea, possible
reliance detriment. The German Civil Code, in section 307(1) provides: Who-
ever, at the time of contracting, knew or should have known that the perform-
ance was impossible, shall compensate the other party for the damages suffered
in reliance on the validity of the contract; the compensation shall not exceed
the other party's interest in the validity of the agreement. As in the case of
36. Compare RESTATEMNT OF CoNTRAcTs § 502 & comments a, e, illustrations 3, 8 (1932)
with id. § 503 & illustration 3. Cf. 5 WILLISTON § 1570, § 1570A, at 4388-91; 3 CoRm § 605,
at 643, § 610, at 670-72.
37. Cf. 6 WILLISTON § 1931; 6 CORBIN § 1320, § 1322, at 328-32 (1962). For a brief
comparison with the civil aw approach, see 6 WILLIsToN § 1979; A. voNr MEMRN, Tun
Cv. LAw Sys= 684-85 (1957); Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through
Legal Devices, 24 CoLurax. L. Rav. 335, 349-50 (1924).
38. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
39. Compare the treatment of "fault" in RESTATEMUNT Or CONTRACTS § 288 (frustration)
and § 457 (impossibility) (1938) with id. § 508 (mistake); compare further RESTATEMNT
or CoNTRACTs § 502 & comment a, illustration 8, § 503 & comment a (1932) and 5 WILLISTON
§§ 1570, 1570A with Corbin's discussion of Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897
(K.B. 1647), in 6 CORBm § 1322 at 328-30, § 1337, at 388.
40. These distinctions have all found their way into common law commentary; see
RESTATEMNT OF CONTRACTS §§ 455, 456, 457, 461 (1932); 6 WILLISTON §§ 1932, 1933, 1946,
1950; 6 CORBIN §§ 1321, 1326, 1332.
41. RESTATEMENT OF CoN mcTs § 456 (1932); 6 WILLISTON § 1933; 6 CORImN §§ 1325,
1326; on the German rule, see BG3l 306.
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mistake, the German Civil Code posits a reliance right which fulfills the first
prerequisite of the tort-schema. Both German and common law found the source
of the mistake so uniquely within the defendant's control as to justify a pre-
sumption of culpability. The Code drops this assumption in the case of objective
antecedent impossibility. The defendant need pay only if he knew or ought to
have known of the impossibility. In other words, the second element of the tort-
schema remains open to proof. Although relevant cases are scarce,42 this treat-
ment probably reflects the premise that in such situations the source of mis-
calculation no longer lies uniquely within the control of one party. The common




Subjective antecedent impossibility describes a performance which, although
not objectively impossible, lies beyond the ability of the promisor at the time of
contracting.44 He contracts to sell his car not knowing that it has been stolen.
The German Civil Code contains no explicit provision on this form of miscalcu-
lation. However, jurists are fairly unanimous on the proper solution: the
promisor guarantees not performance itself but rather his personal ability, at
the time of contracting, to render the performance. In a sales contract, he
vouches not for the existence of the goods (for non-existence of specific objects
leads to objective antecedent impossibility) but for his ability to deliver existing
goods.45 In terms of the tort-schema: The parties said what they meant and
meant what they said, nor was there any ambiguity involved, nor did they agree
on any material fact which turned out otherwise. Consequently, the defendant
may not invoke any mistake doctrine to defeat the plaintiff's right to perform-
ance. As in the case of misstatement, the facts of such situations warrant a pre-
sumption of culpability. The defendant is in a unique position to recognize his
ability to perform, e.g., whether or not he can still dispose of his car at the
time of the contract.
Common law, in contrast, does not presume culpability. The defendant is
excused unless the plaintiff proves him responsible for the miscalculation. 46 The
42. 6 WILLIsTON § 1933 n.8.
43. On the remedies in such a situation, see 5 WILLISTON § 1515; 6 id. § 1933, at 5415.
There is certainly no assumption of culpability; see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 525, 526-30
(1938).
44. This category is implicit in the Restatement's four categories; subjective, objective,
existing, and supervening, see REsTATEimNT oF CONTRACTS §§ 455-57 (1932); it also appears
in the "mistake" section, see id. at § 502 & illustrations 2, 3. This same overlap occurs in
5 WILLISTON §§ 1560, 1561 and 6 id. §§ 1946, 1947, 1948; see also 6 CoRBmN § 1327, at 341-42,
361-63.
45. 1 K. LARENz, SCHULDPXCHT 80-81 (9th ed. 1967); SOERGEL-ScH MT, KommENTAR
zu-m BGB VoR. § 275, Rdnr. 22 (10th ed. 1967). This guaranty is qualified in cases of force
majeure, see K. LARENz, ScHuEDRacHT 81 (9th ed. 1967); ESSER, SCHUDncHT 24-25 (2d
ed. 1960).
46. Cf. RESTATEMET OF CONTRACTS § 455 (1932) and 6 WILLISToN § 1932, at 5411-12
which both categorically deny relief for subjective impossibility. Common law relief is con-
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case material on this type of impossibility is again too meager, both in America
and in Germany, to decide which approach to the culpability issue better ap-
proximates reality.47 Important is the fact that in both systems considerations
of culpability play a decisive role in resolving the claim to performance or its
equivalent in damages.
Objective Subsequent Impossibility
Subsequent impossibility occurs after the contract has been perfected. It
is objective when, for instance, the contract relates to a unique object which is
destroyed before performance is completed. 48 The first relevant provision of the
German Civil Code is section 323(1): If a party's performance becomes im-
possible, for a reason for which neither party is responsible, he loses his claim
for performance against the other party. Suppose a party contracts to sell an
original painting or repair a particular building. Before performance, fire,
caused by neither party destroys the object. Under section 323(1), the per-
forming party loses his claim for compensation. Section 275 defeats the paying
party's claim for performance: A party is freed from performance, if that
performance becomes impossible for reasons for which he is not responsible.
Common law contains the gist of section 275 in the axiom that a party will not
be compelled to do the impossible or that in which performance depends on
the fulfillment of some "condition." Of course, the defendant must not have
caused the performance to become impossible or the condition to remain un-
fulfilled.50 The failure of consideration doctrine parallels section 323(1).r1
In Taylor v. Caldwell, 52 fire accidentally destroyed the defendant's prem-
ises which the plaintiff had leased for a series of concerts. The German Civil
Code would dictate the following disposition of the plaintiff's claim for damages:
Under a rent contract, the lessor must furnish the premisesY3 Destruction
made his performance impossible. Since it was without his fault, section 275(1)
tained in its mistake doctrines, where liability depends upon responsibility factors such as
assumption of risk, diligence, and negligence; see RESTAT MNT OF CONTRACTS §§ 460, 502
& llustrations 2, 3 (1932); 5 WnsasToxr §§ 1560, 1561; 3 CORBIN § 600; 6 id. & 1329, at
346-47, § 1333, at 371.
47. Cf. 5 WILLISTON § 1561, at 4368.
48. On the common law recognition of this category, see RESTATEIENT OF CONTRACTS
§§ 455, 457 (1932) which, when read together, limit the operation of § 457 to objective sub-
sequent impossibility; 6 WILLISTON § 1933; 6 Commr §§ 1321, 1325, at 337, § 1337, at 389,
§ 1339, at 395-97.
49. For brief comments on these sections of the BGB, see 6 WILLISTON § 1979; A. voN
AUHREw, TE Cv- LAW SYSr 685-86 (1957).
50. Cf. REsTATEM NT OF CONTRACTs §§ 457, 454 & comment b (1932); 6 CORBIN
8 1325, at 337-38, § 1329, at 350, § 1333, at 371, § 1337, at 388. On the various manifesta-
tions of this type of impossibility, cf. 6 WILLISTON §§ 1496-1950, 1963. On conditions and
impossibility, see id. § 1937; 6 CORBIN § 1331.
51. See REsTATEMENT oF CoNTRACTS § 274 (1932); 6 CORBm § 1337, at 389, § 1320,
at 323, § 1322, at 326.
52. 3 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863).
53. BGB § 535. In civil law a lease is regarded as a contract rather than a conveyance,
see 6 WILLISTON § 1967, at 5519-20. On the consequences of the distinction, see 6 CormNm
§ 1356, at 467-68, 472-73, § 1358 (1962).
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frees him from performance and damages. The lessee is excused under section
323 (1) from the rent obligation. The common law court in Taylor reaches the
identical result although it reasons in terms of conditions. The term "condi-
tion" does not occur in the German law on impossibility. This difference may
trace back to the legendary period in common law when the right to performance
or its money equivalent in damages was absolute, that is, independent of the
responsibility for non-performance. 55 This strict liability yielded to consideration
of the defendant's diligence as an element in the litigation. As used in Taylor,
"condition" apparently refers to this dependence of the plaintiff's claim on the
defendant's responsibility: "[T]he contract ... is to be construed ... as subject
to an implied condition that the parties shall be excused in case, before breach,
performance becomes impossible from the perishing of the thing without the
default of the contractor." 56 "Condition" appears to have marked a transition.Y
Before, the plaintiff's case consisted of two elements: unfulfilled right and proof
of damages. "Condition" imposed on contracts the full tort-schema which in-
cluded as a third element the responsibility of the defaulting party.
We can, at this point, formulate some distinctions between the doctrines of
mistake and subsequent impossibility. In case of mistake, the miscalculation
prevents the appearance of an enforceable right. On the performance level of
the contract, the issue of negligence never arises. In case of impossibility, the
right to performance stands.58 The defendant pleads instead that he did not
culpably cause non-performance. A showing of diligence will defeat the plain-
tiff's claim for performance or performance damages.59 The treatment of reliance
marks a second distinction. A reliance right also obtains in cases of impossibility.
The plaintiff has relied not on a voidable declaration, as in the case of mistake,
but on a valid performance right. The doctrines of mistake and antecedent ob-
jective impossibility delay consideration of culpability until the reliance level.
In contrast, the doctrine of subsequent impossibility focused, at the performance
level, on the defendant's diligence. A showing of diligence defeated the plain-
tiff's performance claim. The German Civil Code refuses to allow a reconsidera-
tion of the culpability issue as regards injured reliance rights. 60 Culpability at
the reliance level usually concerns the same question as raised under the
responsibility prerequisite at the performance level: was the miscalculation a
reasonable one, did its source fall uniquely within the control of the one party
54. 122 Eng. Rep. at 311-13. The rationale is criticized in 6 CoRniN § 1331, at 355-57
(1962); Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 COLU-.
L. REV. 335, 352 (1924).
55. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
56. 122 Eng. Rep. at 312.
57. Cf. 6 WnLsIToN § 1937; 6 CoRann § 1331, at 356-58.
58. Cf. 6 CopmN § 1327, at 342.
59. This is the import of the repeated references to fault, foreseeability, and diligence
in the common law of impossibility. See RSTAT hNT oF CoNTRcs §§ 457, 454 & comment
b (1932); 6 WmLIsToxq § 1935, at 5419, § 1936, at 5421, § 1959, at 5495-96; 6 CORBIN § 1929,
at 346-48, § 1333, at 365, § 1337.
60. BGB § 323 limits the plaintiff to restitutionary remedies.
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or the other? The initial finding of diligence blocks the plaintiff's reliance claims.
His remedies are limited to restitution. The author has found no commentary
which suggests the common law rule to be different. 61 This may be good logic
but it introduces through a back door a strict liability not unlike that in legend-
ary common law. Since both parties are equally diligent, there is no reason
to burden one of the parties with the entire detriment which results from their
encounter. One finds occasional foment, especially in common law commentary,
for a division of the plaintiff's reliance injuries.
62
Subsequent Personal Inability
Subsequent personal inability is the most common and complex of the im-
possibility varieties. Most contracts do not involve unique objects or services, such
as original paintings, whose destruction before delivery renders performance in a
sense objectively impossible. Sales of consumer goods as well as construction
contracts usually become "impossible" only in the sense that the obligor cannot
or will not finance performance. 63 Section 275(2) of the German Civil Code
equates subsequent personal inability with objective impossibility: Personal in-
ability which occurs after formation of the contract is to be treated in the same
fashion as objective impossibility which follows formation. In conjunction with
section 275(1), personal inability would apparently excuse the defendant from
performance so long as he is not responsible for his inability. However, a sub-
sequent section, 279, sharply limits the breadth of the personal inability rule:
When the obligation involves a genre debt, so long as delivery from the genre
is possible, the performing party remains liable for performance even though
not responsible for his personal inability to deliver from the genre. In the case
of genre debts, replaceable goods or money, the performance becomes "im-
possible" only when the genre itself disappears. A similar rule prevails for build-
ing contracts.6 4 These provisions restrict the applicability of section 275(2) to
personal service contracts.6 5 Genre debts also motivate"6 the common law to a
61. Discussions of impossibility refer to reliance interests far less frequently than do
discussions of mistake. Compare 6 Coanm § 1328, at 344 with authorities cited supra note 13.
62. Fuller & Purdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52,
94-96; 6 CoRnmN 373, 379-83 (1936); Sharp, Promissory Liability 1, 7 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 1,
18-19 (1939) ; 6 CORarn 250, 269 (1940). Contra, RESTATEmMNT oF CoNTRAcTs § 468 (1932)
which limits recovery to restitution; see also 6 WIrsTON §§ 1972, 1974, 1975, 1977. On the
German law, see Von Caemmerer, Bereicherung and Unerlaubte Handlung, 1 FSTsemul-r rht
RABrr 376-79 (1954); 2 LAaaz, ScE-uDREcHT 371-76 (9th ed. 1968).
63. Cf. 6 Wi-tisTor § 1932, at 5412; 6 CoRwn~ § 1332, at 362-63, § 1333, at 365-68,
§ 1339, at 394-97; SOERGEL-SIEBERT, KomasrxnTAR zum BGB VOR. § 275, Rdnrn. 26-27
(10th ed. 1967).
64. BGB §§ 631, 644; see SoERGET-SHMIT, supra note 45, at § 276, Rdnr. 51 (10th
ed. 1967) ; 2 K. LAPY.Nz, ScH-uDRHnT 225-26, 237-39 (9th ed. 1968) ; Soergel-Erdsiek-Miihl
§ 644, Rdnr. 1 (9th ed. 1962).
65. Cf. SOERGEL-ScEMMT, supra note 45, at § 275, Rdnrn. 23, 26-27 (10th ed. 1967).
66. See REsTATEFMENT OF CoNTRAcTs § 460 & comment c, compare illustrations 1, 9, 7,
8 with 13 (1932). On the impact of the distinction between genre and specific debts, see
6 WiLLisToN § 1946, at 5451, § 1949, § 1950, § 1952, at 5468-71, § 1953; 6 Coanm § 1339.
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similar conclusion although via a slightly different route.6 7 In contrast to section
275(2), personal inability receives no relief; exception is then made for personal
service contracts.
68
The reaction to genre debts, in both German and common law suppresses
the notion of impossibility in the largest group of miscalculation cases, those
relating to replaceable goods and reproducible services. In terms of the tort-
schema, the genre nature of the debt seemingly imports an irrebuttable presump-
tion of the defendant's culpability. 69 That the genre notion relates to the culpa-
bility element is especially clear in the German Civil Code. Section 279, which
determines responsibility regarding genre debts, terminates a string of provisions
which describe the responsibility of a party vis-A-vis legal norms.70 Obviously,
section 279 and its common law counterpart do not tell the whole story about
personal inability. If a party promises to deliver objects from a genre, he must,
at some point, be able to rid himself of the risk of miscalculation.71 Because the
genre character of a debt raises the level of impossibility, an errant party will
seldom invoke that defense directly. Instead, one encounters in both systems a
doctrine, "concretization," which preserves the applicability of the tort-schema
and especially its second element of culpability. 72 The German Civil Code, in
section 243, defines "concretization" in the following manner: In the case of a
genre debt, the obligor shall perform with goods of average and representative
quality; as soon as the obligor has completed that which is necessary for per-
formance, the contractual obligation becomes limited to the particular item. The
vague phrase, "completed that which is necessary for performance," contains
the criteria for concretization. Concretization converts the genre debt into a
specific debt. Once a debt is so condretized, two other doctrines, passage of title
and impossibility, apply to shift the risk of miscalculation.
73
In Tarling v. Baxter,74 fire accidentally destroyed the haystack after con-
67. For a general comptrison, see A. VoN VEREN, THE Civms LAW SYsTEM 684-86
(1957); 6 WiLmsTON § 1979; 1 K. LARENz, Sc 'OLDREcT 217 (9th ed. 1968). For a criticism
of the German approach, see Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal
Devices, 24 CoLum. L. REv. 335, 349-50 (1924).
68. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 455 & comment a, illustration 4, § 459 (1932);
6 VILLIsToN § 1932, at 5412, § 1940; 6 CoRBiN § 1327, at 341, § 1332, at 362-63, 365, § 1334,
at 374-75, § 1335, at 378-79.
69. 1 K. LARENz, ScHUiLDREOT 243 (9th ed. 1968). Cf. 6 CoRniN § 1339, at 400-02,
who calls it an assumption of risk, which varies as one's view of reasonable conduct; see id.
§ 1329, at 348.
70. BGB § 276 makes a party responsible for negligent or intentional behavior, and § 278
for the culpability of his servants.
71. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 460 & illustrations 5, 13 (1932); compare 6
WIV.LISTON § 1952, at 5470 with id. § 1949, § 1952, at 5468-69; compare 6 CORBn § 1339,
at 394 with id. § 1339, at 401.
72. The Uniform Sales Act §§ 17, 19(4) calls it ascertainment and appropriation
[hereinafter cited as USA]. Cf. 2 S. WnUSTON, SALES §§ 258, 273a, 274 (rev. ed. 1948).
73. USA §§ 8, 17-19. On the effect of specificity, see 2 S. WnLISTON, SALES §§ 258, 273a,
cases discussed in §§ 274b, 274c (rev. ed 1948). Compare 6 CoRm § 1339, at 395-97 with
§ 1339, at 401-02; compare also 6 WISTON § 1946 with § 1952. On the German law, see 1
K. LARENZ, SCHULDREcHT 243-44 (9th ed. 1968) ; SOERGEL-SCMIDT, supra note 45, at § 243,
Rdnr. 8.
74. 6 B. & C. 360, 108 Eng. Rep. 484 (K.B. 1827).
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summation of the contract but before the buyer took possession. The court
never speaks of impossibility or miscalculating, although miscalculation is clearly
involved. The parties assumed that the stack of hay would still stand on the day
the notes became due. A comparative analysis of the case emphasizes the rela-
tionships between concretization, passage of title and impossibility as well as
the fault orientation of the three concepts. Under the German Civil Code, the
seller must convey possession and good title to the haystack and the buyer
must pay.75 German law makes passage of property a "separate" transaction
which requires (1) agreement that the title should pass and (2) delivery of
actual or constructive possession.7 6 The German lawyer would distinguish three
possibilities in Tarling. First, the title to the haystack had passed, because the
parties so intended and the seller conveyed, and the buyer received possession.
The seller has then fully performed and will succeed in an action for the price.
Destruction of the hay is irrelevant. Second, the title had not passed but the
debt had been concretized onto a particular stack of hay. Here the seller escapes
the confines of section 279 and can invoke impossibility. Fire renders delivery of
the specific haystack impossible. Section 323(1) excuses the buyer from the
obligation to pay, while section 275 excuses the seller from the obligation to
deliver. The loss of the haystack remains on the seller, the expectation loss on
the buyer. Third, there was no concretization. The seller now bears the full
burden of section 279 which denies a defense of impossibility until concretization
plus either passage of title or impossibility.
The common law and the Uniform Sales Act distinguish between the same
three cases. The first case corresponds to the court's interpretation of the facts
in Tarling; the parties "ascertained" a particular haystack and title passed
with consummation of the contract. Since risk of loss is one of the consequences
of passage of title 7 7 the court nonsuited the buyer's action to recover the
purchase price. "[W] here there is an immediate sale, and nothing remains to be
done by the vendor as between him and the vendee, the property in the thing
sold vests in the vendee, and then all the consequences ... follow, one of which
is, that if it be destroyed, the loss falls on the vendee."7 8 The concretization
concept disappears behind the scored language of this key sentence in the court's
opinion.79 The third case would obtain if the parties contracted for the sale of
hay without indicating a particular stack. Although the seller had a certain
stack in mind, this stack later burned. Without ascertainment, the seller cannot
75. BGB § 433, cf. USA § 4f; Uniform Commercial Code § 2-310 [hereinafter cited
as UCCI.
76. BGB §§ 929 (personal property), 925, 873 (real property). For discussion of the
civil law approach, see 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 952, 953 (rev. ed. 1936) [hereinafter
cited as 4 WILLISTON]; Daniels, The German Law of Sales, 6 A.m. J. Con'. L. 470, 472-73
(1957); 2 K. LARENZ, SCHULDRECHT 11-15 (9th ed. 1968).
77. USA § 22; cf. 4 WIrLISTON §§ 961, 962; 2 S. WILLISTON, SALES §§ 300, 301 (rev. ed.
1948).
78. 108 Eng. Rep. at 486 (emphasis added).
79. On the nature and role of concretization, see authorities cited in supra note 66 and
examples in 2 S. WILLISTON, SALES §§ 273a, 274b, 274c (rev. ed. 1948).
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defend himself from the buyer's claim to performance or its equivalent in
damages.8 0
Traditional common law and the German Civil Code seem to diverge only
in the second case, i.e., where the specific debt or concretized genre debt is
destroyed before delivery. Under Tarling v. Baxter, should the ascertained
haystack burn before delivery, the buyer remains liable for the sale price. Under
the German Civil Code, sections 275 and 323 excuse both parties from their
contractual obligations. Both systems now have provisos which detract from the
importance of this distinction. Under the Uniform Sales Act, title passes with
consummation of the contract unless the parties otherwise intend.8 ' Courts are
left free to find a contrary intention and throw the loss on the seller. A German
court would seek to determine why the buyer left the haystack in the possession
of the seller. If it found the buyer's behavior in this regard to be of dubious
propriety, it could throw the loss on the buyer, for instance by finding a transfer
of constructive possession.8 2 In addition, the Uniform Sales Act recognizes, as
does the German Civil Code, the possibility of a delay between concretization
and passage of title. Under section 8 of the Uniform Sales Act, destruction of
the goods during this period, without the fault of either party, avoids the
contract. The result parallels the second alternative under German law: the
buyer loses his claim for delivery, the seller his claim for price, and the seller
bears the loss of the haystack. 8 Both solutions depend on the diligence of the
seller.
"Concretization" serves much the same function as does "condition" in
impossibility cases. "Condition," we noted, provided the device by which courts
softened the legendary, absolute duty to perform the contractual obligation. It
made the duty dependent upon the diligence of the defaulting party. Genre
debts also offer a basis for positing an absolute duty to perform. A person's
access to the genre depends only upon his ability to pay, something as uniquely
within his control as a slip of the tongue or pen. In both German and common
law, the doctrine of concretization softens this assumption of responsibility
by, at some point, converting the genre debt into a specific debt. The doctrines
of impossibility or avoidance then apply with their explicit reference to the
diligence of the defaulting party. In addition, concretization is a prerequisite
for transfer of title, a doctrine which courts can easily manipulate in accordance
with the relative diligence of the parties.8 4 Finally, the vague criteria for con-
80. Cf. 6 WILLISTON § 1952; 6 CORBnI § 1339, at 400-02.
81. USA §§ 18(1), 19.
82. A German court could also find the buyer had delayed acceptance, in which case
destruction, unless the result of the seller's gross negligence, does not defeat the seller's claim
to price. BGB §§ 300, 324. Cf. 1 K. LARENZ, ScHULDRECHT 298-99 (9th ed. 1968).
83. BGB §§ 433, 279, 243, 323, 275. Cf. 1. K. LARENZ, SCHUmiDRECHLT 242-44 (9th ed.
1968) ; 2 K. LARENz, ScE"LDREcnT 68-71 (9th ed. 1968).
84. Under the USA, considerable freedom derives from the tension between § 19(2)
and § 19(4) where a unilateral act will pass title, and §§ 18(1), 19(4), where passage depends
upon the agreement of the parties. In the latter instance, passage of title in the common law
borders on becoming a separate transaction similar to the German practice cited supra note
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cretization readily respond to considerations of culpability.8 5 Whether or not
"anything remains to be done," the criterion in both German and common
law, quickly shades into the question whether that which was already done with
diligence. The finding of diligence on the performance level also blocks, as
described above, claims for damages on the reliance level. The defeated plaintiff
is restricted to restitutionary remedies.
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS: APPLICATION
Or THE TORT-SCmA
Construction Cases
Construction cases illustrate the fault orientation of impossibility pleas. In
Stees v. Leonard,8 6 the contractor erred in his expectations as to the quality of
the soil; the structure collapsed three times. The court rejected the defense of
hardship or impossibility: "If a man bind himself ... to do an act in itself
possible, he must perform his engagement, unless prevented by the act of God,
the law, or the other party to the contract. No hardship, no unforeseen hind-
rance, no difficulty short of absolute impossibility, will excuse him .... ,"8 The
statement makes no overt reference to the culpability of the contractor, nor do
the relevant sections of the German Civil Code. Under section 631 (1) the con-
tractor unconditionally binds himself to build the promised object, and according
to section 644(1) he bears the risks of noncompletion until delivery. In both
German and common law, "delivery" plays the same role as does "concretiza-
tion" in the case of genre debts. "Concretization" not only invites manipulation
according to considerations of diligence, it also introduces passage of title and
impossibility both of which are fault-oriented concepts. Under both the German
and common law system, the "delivery" concept is distorted in order to con-
dition the contractor's liability on his diligence. Where lightning destroys a
half-completed house, they find that a "partial delivery" has already occurred.
The builder can then invoke the fault-oriented rule of impossibility which
excuses him from performance or its equivalent in damages. If the building
was completed and then destroyed, the court would likely find "delivery"
whether or not the owner actually approved the contractor's efforts.88 Frequently,
76 and accompanying text. in this regard, compare 2 S. WIusIzON, SALES § 274, at 43, § 275c
(rev. ed. 1948) with VOLD, SALES § 31, at 184-86 (2d ed. 1959).
85. On the difficulties in the concretization concept, see 2 S. WILLsoI, Sales §§ 273,
274b, 275 (rev. ed. 1948); E. FARNsWORm & J. HAN OLD, CASES ON COMMRCIAL LAW 427(1965).86. 20 Minn. 494,20 Gil. 448 (1874).
87. On the similarities between genre debts and construction contracts, see the examples
in 2 S. WILLSTON, SALES §§ 274b, 274c, 275a, 275b (rev. ed. 1948); compare 6 Wu.LSTON
§ 1964 with § 1952, at 5471-73. Cf. 6 CORBNm § 1333, at 367-68, § 1338, at 391-94, § 1339,
at 396, 401; 1 K. LARENz, SOEUODEcO T 130-32 (9th ed. 1968); 2 id. at 237-38 (9th ed.
1968); SoERGEL-ERDsiE-MfiTL, KOmmENTAR zi-r BGB Vor. § 641, Rdnrn. 1-5 (9th ed.
1962).
88. Cf. 2 S. WILLISTON, SALES §§ 274b, 274c (rev. ed. 1948); 6 WILLISTON §§ 1975,
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the court defines the contractor's duty as one of improvement or repair of an
existing structure. Destruction of the structure enables the contractor to invoke
impossibility. 9 These devices, like "mistake," "impossibility" and "concretiza-
tion," permit consideration of the culpability issue and thereby bring this type
of contract into conformance with the full tort-schema.
Construction contracts also provide an opportunity to compare the different
miscalculation doctrines. In Aerosonic Instrument Corp.90 the defendant pleaded
that it was impossible to build an instrument according to contract specifications.
Under the German Civil Code, one could interpret this defense in a number of
ways: antecedent objective or subjective impossibility, subsequent objective or
subjective impossibility, or as mistake regarding material fact. The same problem
faced the court in Aerosonic. "We must decide whether to treat this question as
one of impossibility of performance, excusing performance; or as a case of mis-
take, in which the risk of mistake was assumed, and grant no relief." 91 The
various pleas yield widely different results. Mistake as to material fact enables
the contractor to avoid the contract on pain of reliance damages. Antecedent
objective impossibility also voids the contract but leaves open the question of
reliance damages. A successful plea of subsequent impossibility offers release
without the possibility of reliance damages. Antecedent subjective impossibility
leads, under German law, to performance liability regardless of the diligence is-
sue, and under common law to release. The courts will pick and choose among
the doctrines depending upon their view of defendant's responsibility: "The real
test . . . is whether impossibility of performance came about through circum-
stances which were beyond the control or without the fault or negligence of the
contractor .... Thus appellant either recognized the peril and gambled ... or it
entered into the contract recklessly. .. . Under the facts here, we find the latter
and conclude that appellant's dilemma is due to its own fault and negligence."
9 2
The passage stresses not only the equality between the doctrines but also the
fact that the choice stems mainly from the impact of the fault issue.93
1976; 6 Conmu, § 1338, at 392. On German law, see SOERGEL-ERDSiEx-M i-n, supra note
87, at § 640, Rndrn. 2-3 (9th ed. 1962); 2 K. LARENZ, SCE"ULDRFCHT 238-39 (9th ed. 1968).
89. 6 WILLISTON § 1965; 6 CORIN § 1337, at 390, § 1338, at 392-93.
90. 1959-1 BCA f[ 2115, p. 9093, ASBCA No. 4129 (1959).
91. The tentative conclusions which the court draws from the alternatives conform
with neither the German nor common law doctrines of mistake or impossibility, either of
which may lead to damages or relief; See supra notes 14, 15, 31, 32, 41, 46, 49, 56 and
accompanying text. On the overlap between mistake and impossibility, see authorities cited in
supra note 35.
92. 1959-1 BCA U 2115, ASBCA No. 4129.
93. On the pivotal role of "fault" in the common law doctrine of impossibility, see
RESTATE MNT OF CONTRACTS §§ 454 & comment b, 457, 460(1), 461 (1932); USA § 8;
6 WILLISTON § 1953, at 5475-76, § 1959; 6 CORBNT § 1329, at 346-50, § 1331, at 358, § 1337,
at 389. On its role in mistake, see RESTATEMONT OF CONTACTS § 501 & comment b, § 508 &
comment a (1932) ; 5 WILLISTON § 1596; 3 CORBIN § 599, at 597-600, § 606, at 646-48, 650-
55, § 608, at 671, 673. On the instrumental nature of the distinction, see 6 CoRani § 1328, at
344.
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Produce and Money Obligations
Produce cases emphasize the relationship between genre debt, concretization,
impossibility, and culpability. In Unke v. Thorp,94 the court found the impossi-
bility doctrine applied since "the parties contracted for the delivery of 600 to
800 bushels of a specific crop of alfalfa, viz., the crop the defendants were thresh-
ing."95 Squillante v. California Lands, IncY8 also demonstrates the consequences
of a successful concretization defense. Concretization turns the genre debt (here
grapes) into a specific debt (grapes from a particular area) and hence subject to
the rules of impossibility: "The sale being of a designated quality of a specific
variety.., to be grown in specific vineyards... the defendant could be com-
pelled to perform the contract only so far as it was possible .... It could not
be compelled to perform impossibilities, nor was it liable in damages for a failure
... not attributable to any fault on its part."97 The language is almost identical
to that in the above cited sections of the German Civil Code, i.e., sections 279,
243, 323, and 275. In Anderson v. May,98 frost had destroyed the seller's crop.
The court found against the defendant and rationalized the higher level of im-
possibility in genre debts. "Where the contract is to do a thing which is possible
in itself . . . the promisor will be liable for a breach thereof, notwithstanding it
was beyond his power to perform it; for it was his own fault to run the risk of
undertaking to perform an impossibility .... "99 In Canadian Industrial Alcohol
Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co.,100 the seller miscalculated the production of one of
his suppliers. The court found that the source of supply had not "been a tacit or
implied presupposition in the minds of the contracting parties .... ,,101 Finally,
it found that the seller had acted culpably for "the [seller did] not even show
that it [had] tried to get a contract from the refinery during the months that
intervened .... It has wholly failed to relieve itself of the imputation of con-
tributory fault."
0 2
The phrase "imputation of contributory fault" reflects the court's sentiment
in Anderson. The argument resembles the logic behind the protection of reliance
interests in cases of misstatement. Ability to deliver from an extant genre, like
misstatement and avoidance, lies so much within the control of the party that
the law can presume culpability. This probably indicates dissatisfaction with the
extremely flexible notion of concretization which, by converting genre into specie
debts, promotes release and uncertainty. Levy Plumbing Co. v. Standard Sanitary
Mfg. Co.'0 3 indicates the point where this dissatisfaction becomes so great that
94. 75 S.D. 65, 59 N.W.2d 419 (1953).
95. 75 S.D. 68, 59 N.W.2d at 422; cf. 6 WILISTON § 1953; 6 CoRiNu § 1339, at 396.
96. 5 Cal. App. 2d 89, 42 P.2d 81 (1935).
97. Id.
98. 50 Minn. 280, 52 N.W. 530 (1892).
99. Id.
100. 258 N.Y. 194, 179 N.E. 383, 80 A.L.R. 1173 (1932).
101. 258 N.Y. at 198, 179 N.E. at 383, 80 A.L.R. at 1176.
102. 258 N.Y. at 199, 179 N.E. at 384, 80 A.L.R. at 1177.
103. 68 S.W.2d 273 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1933).
458
MISCALCULATION IN CONTRACTS
the courts hesitate to apply the concretization doctrine. That point is money
debts. 04 The debtor in Levy Plumbing sought relief because of his inability to
gain access to banking facilities closed by a moratorium. The court rejected the
defense on the ground that the ability to pay was so inherently within the deb-
tor's sphere as to raise a presumption of responsibility: "[A] ppellants were either
fully cognizant of this general financial depression or at least chargeable with
knowledge of it at the time the agreement was made .... It must be presumed
that appellants would not have assumed the obligation to pay in cash, if they
were not able to perform same .... ,,105 Unfortunately, the courts' dissatisfaction
with the concretization notion in no way reduced the incidence of miscalculation
in money debts. Nor did it prevent the courts from devising the doctrine of
"frustration" to deal with these miscalculations.
0 6
Errors Regarding Motivation
Chronologically, the first miscalculations incidental to a contract infect
motivation. A party buys a wedding present in ignorance that the couple has
called off the marriage. Both German and common law unequivocally seek to
deny relief for such errors.' 0 7 In terms of the tort-schema, since the motivations
are antecedent to the agreement, the defendant cannot appeal to the various
mistake doctrines. The plaintiff retains an enforceable right. Presumably he can
prove damages. There remains only the issue of responsibility. Both German and
common law presume that motivations lie even more intimately within a party's
control than do misstatements.' 08 This is illustrated by the size of the claims
which the two assumptions support. The assumption regarding .misstatements
underlies a limited claim for reliance damages. The assumption regarding motiva-
tions supports the much broader claim for performance or its equivalent in dam-
ages. This treatment of motivation quickly blurs at the edges. In Sherwood v.
Walker, the cow's putative sterility induced the seller to the particular bargain.' 09
The facts of the case do not differ appreciably from those of the wedding present
example. Yet, the seller in Sherwood convinced the majority of the court other-
wise. If the party can persuade the court that both he and the buyer proceeded
from the same motivation, he can usually plead mistake regarding material fact.
Performing parties occasionally commit computational errors in figuring
104. 6 WILLISTON § 1932, at 5412; 6 CORBIN § 1332 at 362.
105. Levy Plumbing Co. v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 68 S.W.2d 275 (1933).
106. Virtually all common law frustration cases deal with money debts, see examples in
6 CORBIm § 1355, at 462-64, § 1356, at 467-70, § 1357, at 479, § 1358, at 481, § 1359, at
483-84, § 1360 at 484-85, § 1361, at 491-97. The frustration doctrine is discussed in text infra
notes 112-23.
107. Cf. SOERG.L-E[EM § 119, Rdnrn. 55-61; LARENz, ALLGEm=aEER TE=L 380-81;
At common law, the refusal to recognize errors in motivation is largely contained in the
insistance that the error be collateral or concern facts that became a part of the agreement:
see supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
108. See SOERrEL-HEFEnMEHL § 119, Rdnr. 55; LAaENz, AL GEMEINER TEIL 380-81;
FLUME, ALLGEmonm TmL 425-26.
109. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
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bids. In both German and common law, such errors are deemed as ones in
motivation. The mistake precedes the contract; that is to say, at the time of
formation, the bidder says what he means and vice versa.110 Nor is there any
consensus regarding particular items of the bid. The plaintiff's right to perform-
ance stands. Its vindication depends only on the culpability and damage ele-
ments. The court's behavor in such cases clearly shows the weight accorded to
'the full tort-schema and to its distinguishing factor, responsibility. Whenever the
plaintiff's own behavior seems the least bit suspect, the courts quickly abandon
the assumption of culpability implicit in the doctrine of mistakes regarding
motivation. This contributory culpability arises when the bid contains correct
figures as to the individual items or when the offer must have appeared "too
good to be true.""'
V. FRUTsmTRxoN
We have observed that in German and common law, a claim to perform-
ance or its equivalent in damages requires a determination of the defaulting
party's diligence. We saw, too, the courts' unwillingness to extend this treatment
to the most common of all genre debts, money. This may be traced, in part, to
the different risks facing paying and performing parties. The paying party risks
that, between contract and delivery, the value of the received performance will
fall below the consideration paid. The performing party can generally better
control his risks than can the paying party. A contractor can make soil checks;
a seller can take measures aforehand to insure himself a source of supply and to
see that the goods suffer no damages before delivery. The factors affecting the
market price (e.g., a king's health, war, weather) usually elude the paying
party's influence. In the case of performing parties, the notion of culpability
serves as a criterion for separating the excusable miscalculation from the non-
excusable ones. Where the party cannot control the risks, the concept of diligence
makes little or no sense.112 The court must retain the legendary, absolute liability
or seek another limiting device.
Krell v. Henry"1 3 is one of the earliest and most famous frustration cases.
The defendant had contracted for a room to observe the coronation procession
110. RESTATEMNT OF CONTRACTS § 503 & illustration 1 (1932); 5 WILLISTON § 1578,
at 4410-12; 3 CoRBNr § 606, at 652, § 608, at 672, § 609, at 678-81 (1960); SoaRoEL-
HEERmE . § 119, Rdnrn. 24, 58.
i11. RESTATEMENT oF CONTRACTS § 503, illustration 1 (1932) ; 5 WIIusToN § 1578, at
4410; 3 CoaBm, § 609, at 680-83; SoERcOL-HEFERAmxH § 119, Rdnr. 24; LAREwz, ALLonmx-
RINER T=m 377. If both parties are negligent, a German court can apply the culpa in contra-
hendo doctrine and split damages under BGB § 254; see Kessler & Fine, supra note 5 at
430-32 (1964); Turck, Contribution between Tortfeasors in American and German Law, 41
TL. L. Rxv. 1, 24-26 (1966).
112. Cf. PRossER, TORTS § 31, at 149 (3d ed. 1964): "No man can be expected to guard
against events which are not reasonably to be anticipated... ;" 0. Hoans, TnE CommoN
LAW 110 (Little, Brown & Co. ed. 1881): "The law does not in general hold him liable for
unintentional injury, unless .. . he might and ought to have foreseen the danger .... 1" cf.
1 K. LARI z, SC-U Rn.ECHT 215-16 (9th ed. 1968).
113. [19011 2 K.B. 740 (Ct. App. 1903).
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of King Edward VII. The King fell ill and the procession was cancelled. As
against the owner's claim for the balance due under the contract, the defendant
pleaded that the procession had not occurred, in other words, that he had mis-
calculated about the health of the King. The situation involves both an error in
motivation and a money debt. The defendant's chances of success within the
confines of traditional dogma seem less than sanguine. In launching the "new"
miscalculation defense, the court in Krell sets out three criteria: "[F] irst, what
... was the foundation of the contract? Secondly, was the performance of the
contract prevented? Thirdly, was the event which prevented the performance...
in the contemplation of the parties .. . ?114 The criteria focus directly on the
culpability element of the tort-schema. The first criterion, "foundation of the
contract," serves the same function as "condition" in impossibility cases and
"concretization" in genre debts.'1 5 It limits an otherwise absolute duty to per-
form, here to pay the rent, by making the contractual obligation a function of
a particular event. This clarifies the meaning of the second criterion: was per-
formance prevented? Here performance of neither party is prevented, unless one
defines performance in terms of an outside event, namely the passage of the
King.11 Together, the first and second criteria make the duty to pay conditional
on eventual miscalculation. The "contemplation-of-the-parties" requirement fo-
cuses on the concrete issue of responsibility for the miscalculation. "The test
seems to be whether the event which causes impossibility was or might have
been anticipated or guarded against . ."", This third criterion serves the
same function as "fault" in the mistake and impossibility doctrines.
As stressed above, the objective fault standard does not suit frustration
cases where the risks involved often lie beyond the parties' control. The courts
have a number of alternatives. Like the court in Krell, some adopt the fictitious
contemplation-of-the-parties standard which resembles assumption-of-the-risk in
tort law." 8 Other courts retain the negligence criterion although it clearly does
not befit risks over which neither party exercises control,," Finally, a few courts
practice in public what they usually hide behind "objective" standards of fic-
tions. They undertake an undisguised allocation of risks: "The question in cases
involving frustration is whether the equities of the case, considered in the light
of sound public policy, require placing the risk of a disruption or complete de-
114. Id. at 749.
115. Id. at 751, where the court defines "foundation" in terms of conditions: "[Y]ou
first have to ascertain ... what is the substance of the contract, and then to ask the question
whether that substantial contract needs for its foundation the assumption of the existence
of a particular state of things." Cf. REsTATEIMNT oF CONTRACTS § 288 (1932); 6 WILLISTON
§ 1954; 6 CoRINT § 1355.
116. 6 JW~LISTON § 1954, at 5477, 5480-81; 6 CoRBNm § 1355, at 464-65.
117. On the role of the responsibility element, see RESTATEMNT OF CONTACTS § 288 &.
comment b (1932); 6 CoRsnT § 1354, at 459, § 1355, at 464-66.
118. See criticism in 6 CoRasm § 1354 citing cases.
119. See, e.g., the reference to "fault" in RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 288 (1932).
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struction of the contract equilibrium on defendant or plaintiff under the circum-
stances of a given case. -12o
The inapplicability of "objective" standards of culpability also makes itself
felt at the reliance level. In impossibility cases, we observed that a finding of
diligence at the performance level blocked a reconsideration of the responsibility
issue at the reliance level. Diligence on both levels related to the same subject
matter. In frustration cases, the reliance issue does not always yield to this
slight-of-hand. As soon as open risk allocation replaces reference to fictitious ob-
jective standards, dogmatic consistency is no longer a necessity. Loss splitting
becomes possible.12 1 A court can decide that the plaintiff risked the king's bad
health as regards the performance right but that the defendant must make good the
plaintiff's reliance detriment. Krell did, in fact, end with a splitting of the loss.
The defendant defeated the claim for the unpaid balance of fifty pounds but
dropped his cross-claim for the return of twenty-five pounds paid on the con-
tract. Unfortunately, we never learn the extent of the plaintiffs reliance injuries.
The theory of frustration has its counterpart in German law. The German
Civil Code contains no directly relevant provision. The debate over the proper
foundation of the doctrine has been described at length elsewhere.122 Suffice it to
say, the majority now base frustration on the code's "good faith" clauses, espe-
cially section 242:123 The obligor shall perform in a manner consistent with good
faith and commercial practices. Concretization of this clause in a particular situ-
ation turns on the same factors as determinative in the common law version of
frustration. A contractual "basis" (Grundlage) must exist, subsequent events
must have interfered with this basis, and neither party must have assumed the
risk of interference. If such prerequisites are fulfilled, it violates the "good faith"
provision to permit one party to enjoy a windfall profit at the other's expense.
124
VI. WARRANTY
The warranty remedies are also vitally concerned with miscalculation.
12
The seller may overlook a valuable quality, the buyer a noxious one. We have
already examined the seller's remedy, a mistake as to material fact. One could
120. Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 51, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (1944).
121. Cf. 6 CoRBn § 1355, at 463-67, § 1356, at 471-75; Fuller & Purdue, The Reliance
Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE LJ. 373, 380-83 (1931).
122. Hay, Frustration And Its Solution In German Law, 10 A.. J. Comn'. L. 345,
358-64, 368 (1961).
123. Id. at 369-70, 363; cf. SoERGEL-SiEBERT-KqAPP, KOn=TAR zum BGB VOR. § 242,
Rdnrn. 365-67, 374-77 (10th ed. 1967); contra, FLuME, ALLGEmEINER T=L 497-507 (1965),
124. Hay, supra note 122, at 360-62, 368-70; LARwEz, ALLToEwE R TE 395 (1967);
but see FLuM, ALLOEMEuIE1 T IL at 497-500. For a similar statement in American com-
mentary, see 6 CoRiX § 1355, at 463, 465-66.
125. Cf. 5 WIL-ISTON § 1563; E. FARNSWORT 1 & J. HANNOLD, CASES ON COMERCAL
LAW 468 (1965); 2 RABEL, REHT DES WARENKAU-S 116-18 (1958); 2 K. LARENZ, SCnUD-
RECOT 54-57 (9th ed. 1968).
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treat the buyer's miscalculation regarding quality in the same fashion: upon
proof of materiality and agreement regarding the characteristic, he could avoid
the contract. Resolution of the interests on the reliance level would depend upon
the application of the tort-schema, especially the culpability prerequisite.
Both German and common law do in fact provide a warranty remedy similar
to that for mistake. That remedy is rescission.126 Administration of the remedy
reflects the tort-schema: injuried right, responsibility, and damages. The right
must originate, under the common law, in either an express or implied war-
ranty.127 In contrast, section 459 of the German Civil Code makes certain war-
ranty rights an element of every contract unless excluded by agreement: the
seller guarantees to the buyer that the goods, at the time when the risk passes,
contain no defects which diminish their value or their fitness for normal uses or
for such as described in the contract. Like the remedy for mistake regarding a
material fact, the right to rescission entails agreement, either by the parties or
imposed by the law, regarding the particular characteristic. The damage element
of the tort-schema appears in the requirement that the defect not be trivial.
128
This parallels the mistake doctrine that the miscalculation must relate to an
essential item of the contract. There remains only the culpability element. For
rescission, neither German nor common law, require proof that the seller acted
negligently.129 The presumption of responsibility is justified, as in the case of
mistake, by the fact that one party, here the seller, has posession of the goods,
hence controls the source of the miscalculation. 80
In contrast to mistake situations, it is now the buyer who has destroyed the
contract and the seller who may suffer reliance injury. But the seller's reliance
claim must fail on the culpability issue. Unlike in the case of mistake, the source
of the miscalculation (here, the defective good) is not in the control of the avoid-
ing party. The law protects the seller's need to rely on the validity of the con-
tract in other ways. First, the seller must answer for only those defects present
when the risk in the goods passes to the buyer.' 3 ' Second, the German Civil Code
demands that the seller promptly learn of the defect; indeed, the buyer must
126. USA § 69(1) (d); UCC §§ 2-601, 2-608, 2-711(1); BGB §§ 459, 462.
127. These warranty rights constitute a third level of contractual relationships. Their
historical similarity to the tort action of deceit indicates that they more resemble the com-
munity norms of tort and reliance than the two-party, performance rights of contractual
origin; on this point, see 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES §§ 195, 196, 197 (rev. ed. 1948) ; 2 RABEL,
RECHT DES WARENXAUIS 104-07 (1958); 2 K. LARENz, SCnLDRECHT 55-56 (9th ed. 1968);
Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 CoLurm. L. REv.
335, 357-58 (1924).
128. Cf. 1 S. WILLISrON, SALES § 225a (rev. ed. 1948); BGB § 459 para. 1.
129. 1. S. WILLISTON, SALES § 237 (rev. ed. 1948); SOERGEL-HALLERSTEDT, KOIDIENTAR
zum BGB VoR. § 459, Rdnr. 5 (10th ed. 1967).
130. On the relationship between culpability and control, see 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES
§ 237a (rev. ed. 1948).
131. Cf. 2 S. WILLIsToN, SALES § 212a, at 550 (rev. ed. 1948); BGB § 459; 2 K. LARENz,
ScruwREcHr 39-40 (9th ed. 1968).
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bring his action within six months.132 Under the common law, the buyer must
promptly notify the seller of the defect or forfeit his right.
133
In both German and common law, the buyer has several variations on the
rescission remedy. In Germany, he can require adjustment of the sale price or,
in the case of a genre debt, delivery of conforming goods.' 34 Under the Uniform
Sales Act, the buyer can also diminish the sale price.' 3 5 The Uniform Commercial
Code retains that remedy and adds the possibility of cure.'30 These remedies
resemble rescission, in that they limit the seller's liability to the contract value
of the promised performance.
Both German and common law afford the buyer, in addition to rescission,
damages, which is a quite different remedy for breach of warranty.13 7 In both
systems the measure of damage liability is limited only by the general provisions
of proximity, certainty, etc.' 38 It can far exceed the market value of the prom-
ised goods which, as described above, bounds the seller's liability in the case
of rescission and its variants. The German Civil Code distinguishes between the
prerequisites for rescission and those for damages. Section 463 allows damages
only in case of express warranty or fraudulent concealment. The Uniform Sales
Act foresees the damage remedy for both express and implied warranties. Com-
parative studies fondly cite these damage provisions as among the most signifi-
cant differences between the German and common law of sales.13 They originate
not so much from divergent warranty notions as from dissimilar norms for the
measurement of damages. The differences enable German and common law to
integrate the responsibility element into warranty relief.
The common law couples liability with the manner and degree of representa-
tion. The more express an agreement becomes, the greater the potential measure
of damages.' 40 Upon breach, the buyer will claim special damages on the grounds
that particular uses were within the contemplation of the parties. In contrast, if
the agreement remains tacit, the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale will block special
damages. 14 ' In the case of especially culpable behavior, e.g., fraudulent conceal-
132. BGB § 477. Cf. 2 RABEL, REcHT DES WARENEAurS 279 (1958). In some jurisdic-
tions of the United States, the shorter tort statute of limitations will apply if the warranty
action is to recover for personal injuries; see 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES § 212a (rev. ed. 1948,
Supp. 1967 n. Ila). UCC § 2-725 adopts a four year statute of limitations.
133. USA § 49; cf. 3 S. WILsToN, SALES § 484, at 38-39, § 484b, at 41-42 (rev. ed.
1948). See also UCC § 2-607(3). The same rule applies in German law where the parties are
registered merchants. HANDELSOSETZBUCH § 377 para. 1 (Ger. 13th ed. Baumbach-Duden
1959) ; cf. 2 K. LARENz, Sc XRDu c T 42 (9th ed. 1968).
134. BGB §§ 462, 480; cf. Daniels, The German Law of Sales, 6 Am. J. Comp. LAW
470, 491-92 (1957); 3 S. WILLISTON, SALES §§ 606, 609 (rev. ed. 1948).
135. USA § 69(1)(a).
136. UCC § 2-508.
137. USA § 69(1) (b); UCC §§ 2-711, 2-714; BGB § 463.
138. USA § 69(6), (7); UCC§§ 2-714, 2-715; BGB §§ 463, 249, 252. See 3 S. WILLIS-
TON, SALES §§ 614a, 614b (rev. ed. 1948).
139. Cf. 2 RABEL, RECHT DES WARENcAirs 254 (1958); Daniels, The German Law of
Sales, 6 Amr. J. Coare. L. 470, 489-92 (1957).
140. Cf. 3 S. WILZISTON, SALES § 614, at 371 (rev. ed. 1948).
141. See 3 S. WILISTON, SALES §§ 599b, 599c, 614b (rev. ed. 1948).
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ment, the party can avoid the restriction in Hadley with a tort claim based on
deceit.
142
For such variable damage liability to function properly, warranty provisions
must gradate the explicitness of the guaranties. The Uniform Sales Act does just
that. It excludes most implied warranties 143 (implied warranties provide no gra-
dation of explicitness). Excepted are the sale by description and the situation
where the buyer communicates the purpose of the goods and his reliance on the
seller's judgement. The sale by description is, in effect, a diluted express war-
ranty.144 The second exception is difficult to imagine without certain representa-
tions of skill by the seller. It also becomes a form of express warranty. The
common law does not, in contrast to the German Civil Code, make certain
warranties a part of all contracts. Instead, it bases liability on more or less
explicit guaranties. Damage liability, as described above, varies with the explicit-
ness.
The German Civil Code, in section 249, establishes a uniform measure of
damages for all claims, whether arising from tort, contract, or property rights:
The party liable to pay damages shall restore the condition which would have
obtained if the event making him liable had not occurred. This measure of dam-
ages does not, in contrast to the common law, depend upon the culpability or
the contemplation of the parties. The extent of relief must accord with two
"objective" standards: foreseeability and appropriateness (were the injuries
highly improbable and did the violated norm protect against them).145
This unitary measure of damages yields to other devices, such as the differ-
ent warranty remedies, which accommodate the responsibility element. 146 In the
case of code warranties under section 459, German law presumes the seller re-
sponsible for the defect. The presumption provides the basis for relief. But since
it is just an assumption, the law limits the measure of relief to rescission, adjust-
ment of the sales price, or perfect delivery. 147 The common law, in such a situa-
tion, circumscribes relief from two sides. The Uniform Sales Act lacks code
warranties and recognizes implied warranties only to a very limited extent. If the
buyer does succeed in invoking an implied warranty, the law does not limit him
to the rescission remedy. However, where the parties have said nothing about the
purposes of the goods, the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale restricts the possible
142. Cf. RESTATEMET Or TORTS §§ 525, 549 & comments a, b, d, illustration 3 (1938);
3 S. WILISTON, SALES §§ 613a, 646 (rev. ed. 1948).
143. USA §§ 14, 15; cf. 1 S. WILLISTON, SALES §§ 227, 228 (rev. ed. 1948).
144. Cf. 1 S. WILISTON, SALES § 223a (rev. ed. 1948); E. FAP-swoRam & J. HANNOLD,
CASES ON CornrmcL, LAw 454 (1965).
145. Cf. K. LARENZ, SCH-uLDREc=T 154-57, 161 (9th ed. 1968); SOERGEL-SC mMT,
supra note 22, at 249-253, Rdnrn. 17-22. It is generally conceded that the German provisions
allow a greater measure of damages than the common law rule in Hadley v. Baxendale. For
a comparative discussion, see 1 RABEL, DES WARENRAuTS 483-89 (1936), Steindorff,
Abstrakte und Konkrete Schadensberechnung, 158 ARcIv FriR CrvmisTCnE PRAXIS 431,
436-37 (1959).
146. See 2 RABEL, RECHT DES WARENxAurs 254-55 (1958).
147. Id. at 254-55, 261-62; 2 K. LARENZ, ScxuLDREcHT 49 (9th ed. 1968); cf. W.
PROSSER, TORTS § 60, at 338 (2d ed. 1955).
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damage claim. Often the buyer will recover only the difference between the mar-
ket values of the defective goods and conforming goods. This may amount to
little more than the remedy of recoupment.
148
In German law, express warranty or fraudulent concealment considerably
strengthen the presumption of liability in section 459, if not entirely disposing
of its necessity. They found the broad measure of damages under section 249.
In like circumstances, common law liability may also increase because the repre-
sentations contained in the express warranty support a claim for special damages.
In the case of deliberate concealment, the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale should
not affect the increased damages available from a tort action in deceit.149
VII. CONCLUSION
Warranty is, no less than mistake, impossibility and frustration, concerned
with miscalculation. Like the other miscalculation doctrines, its allocation of risk
conforms to a simple dogmatic pattern, the tort-schema. Each doctrine involves
three considerations: was a right injured, who was responsible and in what de-
gree, and what was the harm involved? The second issue, responsibility, plays
the decisive role. It appears in warranty and the other miscalculation doctrines
in a variety of forms, ranging from presumptions to detailed examination of indi-
vidual behavior. The degree of culpability as well as the type of determination
control the extent of liability. When culpability is minor or presumed (usually
because one party controls or possesses the source of error) the law reduces lia-
bility: limited damages, restitution, adjustment of the sale price, etc. More
blameworthy conduct increase liability to preformance or its equivalent in dam-
ages. Increased liability also follows a detailed examination of the responsibility
issue, necessary where the error concerns more remote facts such as a king's
health, the weather, soil conditions, etc.
In a given factual situation, any or all of the different doctrines may be
applicable. They differ mainly in their formulation of the culpability issue. A
party will plead the one instead of the others according to which statement of
culpability best corresponds to his situation. A paying party will likely turn to
frustration or warranty. The culpability element of the latter sounds largely in
terms of sales contracts; that of the former, in terms of leases. The performing
party will plead mistake or impossibility, depending upon whether he is involved
in a sale or, say, a construction contract or a lease. In any case, the options
open to the court remain essentially the same from one doctrine to the next: the
court can adjust the liability according to its view of the culpability of the
parties.
This discussion does not portend to be a practical guide to the solution of
individual cases. On the contrary, it shows exactly why a particular case must
elude any purely dogmatic or "mechanical" approach. At legendary common
148. Compare 3 S. WnLIsToN, SALEs § 605, at 334-35 (rev. ed. 1948) with § 613, at 366.
149. See authorities cited supra note 141.
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law, a plaintiff's case in a contract litigation consisted of two elements: injured
right and damages. Rights and duties are abstract notions which yield readily
to the calculus of dogma. Given an organon, the student could resolve the legal
relationships in any given case.
Once culpability enters as a third element in the schema, the situation
changes radically. A formal dogmatic organon is still possible. In fact, with the
addition of a new element, it can flower into something of arcane and intricate
beauty. But it will not "solve" cases. Rights and duties are as steadfast and
enduring as the prose of contracts and constitutions. In contrast, the culpability
notion is a function of common sense, reasonable men, prejudice, good faith,
commercial practices, customs, morals-factors too varied, numerous and fickle
to yield readily to a neat calculus. The student must instead acquaint himself
with the institutions which determine the nature and impact of the factors.
Much said and done here touches indirectly on the mooted role of dogma
in legal reasoning. The present dichotomy between interest analysis and analyti-
cal (or mechanical) jurisprudence results from an unfortunate misunderstand-
ing. Both are absolutely necessary. Let there be no mistake about it; interests
can be discovered, interpreted, evaluated, and reconciled only within an overly-
ing conceptual framework. The exact nature of that framework is quite literally
a matter of individual taste. In this discussion, the author has focued on a sim-
ple and traditional organon (the tort-schema) and demonstrated how it serves as
a framework for a variety of legal concepts. The result is what one may expect
from analytic studies. The method discovers similarities in otherwise unrelated
doctrines. Second, it spots and articulates the open issues (here, culpability)
whose resolution cannot be achieved without reference to underlying institutions
and customs. This indicates the major role of dogmatic analysis: to direct
investigations in the otherwise chaotic realm of interests.-50
150. In time, the particular organon is influenced by the institutions which it purports
to analyze; see E. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. Cm. L. REv. 501, 506
(1948).

